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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Dana C. Nifosi *
I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews judicial, legislative, and regulatory devel-
opments in environmental law from 2008 through the spring of
2009. In addition to developments in the law of Virginia, this ar-
ticle also addresses federal cases and regulatory changes of signi-
ficance to the Commonwealth.
II. RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Cases of the Supreme Court of the United States
The Supreme Court of the United States issued five opinions
arising under federal environmental law in its 2008-2009 term,
and in several of these cases, deference to federal regulatory
agencies figured prominently. Although none addressed questions
specifically involving Virginia law, they articulate principles of
general applicability to environmental litigation and regulatory
programs of the Commonwealth relating to preliminary injunc-
tions, standing to sue, the use of cost-benefit analysis in rulemak-
ing, Superfund liability, and federal wetlands permitting.
1. Preliminary Injunctions
In the first environmental case of the term, Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court reiterated the
standard for issuing preliminary injunctions, focusing particular-
ly on the balance of equities and public interest in the calculus.'
The case involved the United States Navy's use of "mid-frequency
* Partner, Venable LLP, Vienna, Virginia. J.D., 1991, George Washington University
School of Law; B.A., 1986, Tufts University.
1. See 555 U.S. , 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008).
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active" ("MFA") sonar to train sonar operators to detect and track
submarines during training exercises conducted off the coast of
southern California. 2 The plaintiffs-environmental groups and
individuals concerned with protecting the wide variety of marine
mammals located in the area where the Navy would conduct its
training exercises-alleged that MFA sonar causes serious injury
to such animals and sought declaratory and injunctive relief on
the grounds that the Navy's training violated the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), the Endangered Species Act, and
the Coastal Zone Management Act ("CZMA"). 3 Specifically, the
plaintiffs argued that the Navy should have prepared an envi-
ronmental impact statement ("EIS") pursuant to NEPA, rather
than the more limited environmental assessment ("EA") the Navy
actually prepared. 4
The district court granted a blanket preliminary injunction
against using MFA sonar during training exercises, finding that
the plaintiffs "demonstrated a probability of success" on the me-
rits of their NEPA and CZMA claims, as well as "at least a 'possi-
bility' of irreparable harm to the environment."5 The Navy filed
an emergency appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, which agreed that injunctive relief was appro-
priate, but remanded the case to the district court with instruc-
tions to issue a narrower injunction that would allow the Navy to
conduct some training exercises.6 The Navy appealed two of the
restrictions imposed on the use of MFA sonar in the subsequent
injunction issued by the district court and also sought relief from
the Executive Branch.7 The President, acting on the Navy's re-
quest, granted an exemption from the CZMA. Additionally, given
the "emergency circumstances," the Council on Environmental
Quality ("CEQ") authorized the Navy to implement "alternative
2. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 370-71.
3. Id. at __ 129 S. Ct. at 371, 372.
4. Id. at __ 129 S. Ct. at 372, 381.
5. Id. at __ 129 S. Ct. at 372-73.
6. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 373 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 502
F.3d 859, 865 (9th Cir. 2007)).
7. Id.
8. Id.
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arrangements" to NEPA compliance and allowed the Navy to con-
tinue its training exercises while employing voluntary mitigation
measures.9
The Navy filed a motion to vacate the district court's prelimi-
nary injunction, which the district court denied.10 The Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed, finding that (1) there was a question as to whether
the CEQ's application of the "emergency circumstances" regula-
tion was lawful, (2) plaintiffs had established a likelihood of suc-
cess on their NEPA claim, (3) plaintiffs had demonstrated a "pos-
sibility" of irreparable harm, and (4) the balance of hardships and
consideration of the public interest favored the plaintiffs."
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and vacated the
injunction to the extent that the Navy had challenged it. 2 The
Court held that the "possibility of irreparable harm" standard ap-
plied by the Ninth Circuit in support of the preliminary injunc-
tion was too lenient and reiterated that plaintiffs seeking prelim-
inary relief must demonstrate that irreparable harm is likely if a
preliminary injunction is not issued. 13 Moreover, after reviewing
the voluntary mitigation measures the Navy had employed, the
Navy's need to conduct training utilizing MFA sonar, and the po-
tential harm to marine mammals, the Court concluded that "the
balance of equities and consideration of the overall public interest
in this case tip strongly in favor of the Navy."'" In support of that
conclusion, the Court noted that the "lower courts failed properly
to defer to senior Navy officers' specific, predictive judgments
about how the preliminary injunction would reduce the effective-
ness of the Navy's [southern California] training exercises. '11
9. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 373-74 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (2008)).
10. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 374 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council v. Winter, 527 F.
Supp. 2d 1216 (C.D. Cal. 2008)).
11. Id.
12. Id. at __ 129 S. Ct. at 382.
13. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 375.
14. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 378.
15. Id. In a very recent decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit significantly tightened the standards that a plaintiff must meet to be entitled to a
preliminary injunction, in accordance with the dictates in Winter. See Real Truth About
Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2009). Under this new, tighter stan-
dard, a plaintiff "seeking the preliminary injunction must demonstrate by a clear show-
ing": (1) the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits at trial; (2) absent preliminary re-
lief, plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm; (3) the balance of equities tips in
plaintiffs favor; and (4) the injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 345-46 (internal qu-
otations and citations omitted). All four requirements must be satisfied, and the plaintiff
2009]
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The Court declined to address the underlining merits of the
plaintiffs' case.16 Commenting that the factors considered above
are pertinent to assessing the appropriateness of any injunction,
preliminary or permanent, however, the Court cautioned that "it
would be an abuse of discretion to enter a permanent injunction,
after final decision on the merits, along the same lines as the pre-
liminary injunction."17
2. Standing
The next environmental case the Supreme Court decided in the
2008-2009 term, Summers v. Earth Island Institute, addressed
the issue of whether plaintiff environmental groups had standing
to continue to pursue the facial challenge of two regulations of the
United States Forest Service ("Forest Service") after settling its
as-applied challenge to the same regulations. 8 The regulations at
issue19 exempt certain Forest Service fire-rehabilitation activities
and salvage-timber sales from notice, comment, and administra-
tive appeal requirements of the Forest Service Decisionmaking
and Appeals Reform Act.20
Plaintiffs challenged the two regulations facially and as-
applied to the Burnt Ridge Project-a salvage sale of timber on
238 acres of Sequoia National Forest damaged by a fire. 21 Pur-
suant to the regulations, the Forest Service did not provide public
notice of the sale, provide for a period of public comment, or make
an appeal process available. 22 Plaintiffs also facially challenged
six other Forest Service regulations that were not applied to the
Burnt Ridge Project. 23
The district court granted a preliminary injunction against the
sale, and the parties soon settled their dispute over the applica-
bears the burden of proof with respect to each element.
16. Winter, 555 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 381.
17. Id.
18. 555 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1147-48 (2009).
19. 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a), 215.12(f) (2008).
20. Summers, 555 U.S. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 1147; see also Act of Oct. 5, 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-381, § 322, 106 Stat. 1374, 1419-20 (1992).
21. Summers, 555 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1147, 1148.
22. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1147-48.
23. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1148.
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tion of the regulations to the Burnt Ridge Project.24 The Forest
Service argued that, given the settlement, plaintiffs lacked stand-
ing to challenge any of the regulations facially and that the chal-
lenge was not ripe.25 The district court rejected these arguments
and adjudicated the merits of plaintiffs' facial challenge to all of
the regulations, invalidating five Forest Service regulations and
issuing an injunction against their application, effective nation-
wide. 16 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined that the regula-
tions not at issue in the Burnt Ridge Project were not ripe for ad-
judication due to a lack of case or controversy, but affirmed the
district court's determination that sections 215.4(a) and 215.12(f)
were contrary to law and upheld the nationwide injunction with
respect to them.27
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to facially challenge sections 215.4(a) and 215.12(f) after
settlement of their as-applied challenge.28 The Court noted that
Article III restricts the judicial power "to redress or prevent ac-
tual or imminently threatened injury to persons caused by pri-
vate or official violation of law," and that the doctrine of standing
reflects this limitation.2 9 The Supreme Court further noted:
To seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show that he is under
threat of suffering "injury in fact" that is concrete and particularized;
the threat must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothet-
ical; it must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defen-
dant; and it must be likely that a favorable judicial decision will pre-
vent or redress the injury.30
Recognizing that the regulations at issue governed the actions
of the Forest Service and did not require or prohibit any action by
plaintiffs, the Court stated that under such circumstances,
"standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily 'substantially more
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, No. CIV F-03-6386 JKS, 2005 WL
5280466, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2005)).
27. Id. (citing Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 696 (9th Cir. 2007)).
28. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1149-50, 1153. The Court did not disturb the Ninth Cir-
cuit's dismissal of the environmental groups' challenge to the remaining regulations,
which was not appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1153.
29. Id. at ,129 S. Ct. at 1148-49.
30. Id. at ,129 S. Ct. at 1149 (citing Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)).
2009]
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difficult' to establish."31 The Court concluded that the plaintiff en-
vironmental organizations had failed to satisfy the injury in fact
requirement of standing-the "hard floor of Article III jurisdic-
tion"-because they could not identify any application of the inva-
lidated regulations that threatened imminent or concrete harm to
their members' interests after the voluntary settlement of their
dispute regarding the application of the regulations to the Burnt
Ridge Project. 32
Additionally, the Court denied the environmental organiza-
tions' claim that they had standing to bring their challenge due to
the "procedural injury" they suffered because the challenged reg-
ulations denied them the ability to comment on certain Forest
Service actions and the regulations would continue to deny them
this ability in the future. 3 The Court found that a person only has
standing to challenge the denial of a procedural right that is
granted "to protect his concrete interests," thereby establishing in-
jury in fact. 34 This limitation on standing to redress denial of pro-
cedural rights is likely to come into play in future environmental
cases seeking to challenge agency actions under federal environ-
mental laws.
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis
In Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") use of
cost-benefit analysis in promulgating regulations under section
316(b) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 35 which requires that the
location, design, construction, and capacity of cooling water in-
take structures "reflect the best technology available for minimiz-
ing adverse environmental impact."36 Overturning a decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the
Court gave deference to the EPA, holding that the agency reason-
ably viewed section 316(b) as permitting consideration of the
31. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992)).
32. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1149-51.
33. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1151.
34. Id. (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7).
35. 556 U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1502-03 (2009) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006)).
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b).
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technology's costs in setting national performance standards and
in providing variances from those standards.17
Since 1995, the EPA has promulgated regulations under sec-
tion 316(b) to regulate operators of industrial power plants that
employ cooling water intake structures, which extract water from
nearby sources, to cool their facilities.18 These structures pose
threats to aquatic organisms due to "entrainment," which occurs
when organisms are drawn up into the intake, or "impingement,"
which occurs when organisms become trapped against screens
and grills intended to keep them from being drawn in. 9 The
second phase of regulations the EPA promulgated to implement
section 316(b) ("Phase II") set national performance standards for
existing facilities that required cooling water intake facilities to
reduce the level of impingement and entrainment. 40 However, the
agency expressly declined to mandate the adoption of closed-cycle
cooling systems or equivalent reductions in environmental im-
pacts.41 The EPA reasoned that, due to the generally high costs of
converting existing facilities to closed-cycle operations and the
availability of other technologies that approach the performance
of this option, the approach of the Phase II regulations would
create substantially similar results at lower cost with fewer im-
plementation problems.4 2 The EPA further permitted the issuance
of site-specific variances from the national performance standards
for facilities that demonstrated either that "the costs of com-
pliance are 'significantly greater than' the costs considered by the
agency in setting the standards or that the costs of compliance
'would be significantly greater than the benefits of comply-
ing ....
In remanding the regulations to the EPA, the Second Circuit
found the agency's cost-benefit analysis, which 'compare[d] the
costs and benefits of various ends, and [chose] the end with the
best net benefits,"' impermissible under section 316(b).4 4 In a 5-4
37. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1510.
38. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1502-03.
39. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1516 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1504 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 125.94(b)(1)-(2) (2008)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 125.94(a)(5)(i)-(ii)).
44. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1505 (quoting Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83, 98
(2d Cir. 2007)).
20091
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
decision reversing the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court focused
on the second step of the administrative law doctrine derived
from Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., stating that an agency's reasonable interpretation of a sta-
tute governs regardless of whether it is the most reasonable in-
terpretation. 45 After reviewing the statutory language of section
316(b), 46 the language of parallel provisions, 47 and the historical
practice of the EPA in interpreting the statute, 48 the Court con-
cluded that the EPA reasonably interpreted the statutory lan-
guage and, therefore, "permissibly relied on cost-benefit analysis
in setting the national performance standards and in providing
for cost-benefit variances from those standards as part of the
Phase II regulations."49
4. Superfund Liability
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United
States ("BNSF"), the Supreme Court held that: (1) parties are not
liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or "Superfund")50 as "ar-
rangers" for the disposal of hazardous waste unless they take in-
tentional steps to dispose of a hazardous substance; 51 and (2)
parties at a multi-party Superfund site are not jointly and sever-
ally liable if a "reasonable basis" exists to apportion their liabili-
ty. 52 As a result, the Court upheld the district court's finding that
the federal government was responsible for ninety-one percent of
the cost of remediating contamination attributable to an agricul-
tural chemical distributor that was no longer in business. 53 The
45. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-44 (1984) (prescribing a two-step inquiry that courts should conduct when reviewing
an agency's construction of a statute: (1) whether Congress has directly addressed the pre-
cise question at issue; and (2) if not, whether the agency's interpretation was reasonable)).
46. See id. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 1505-06.
47. See id. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 1506.
48. See id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1509.
49. Id. at__, 129 S. Ct. at 1510.
50. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).
51. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. 1870,
1879 (2009).
52. Id. at , 129 S. Ct. at 1881.
53. See id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1882-84.
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decision will have broad implications for the cleanup of hazardous
waste sites throughout the country.
BNSF presented two questions regarding the payment of re-
mediation costs for the cleanup of a hazardous waste site: (1)
whether an entity that delivered pesticides to an agricultural
chemical distributor could be required to pay for the cost of reme-
diating the distributor's site pursuant to CERCLA, and (2)
whether the Ninth Circuit properly held two companies jointly
and severally liable for the entire cost of remediating the site.54
Given the complexity of the case, a detailed summary of the facts
is useful to an understanding of its potential application in future
cases in Virginia and elsewhere.
Brown & Bryant, Inc. ("B & B") began operating an agricultur-
al chemical distributor in 1960, purchasing chemicals, like the
pesticide D-D, from suppliers, including Shell Oil Company
("Shell").55 In 1975 B & B expanded its operations, leasing an ad-
jacent parcel of land jointly owned by the Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railway Company and the Southern Pacific Transporta-
tion Company (now known, respectively, as the Burlington
Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company and Union Pacific
Railroad Company) ("Railroads").56 While B & B was in operation,
many chemicals, including D-D, spilled during transfers and de-
liveries and, due to D-D's corrosive properties, compromised sto-
rage equipment.5 7
Beginning in 1983 both the California Department of Toxic
Substances Control ("DTSC") and the EPA investigated B & B's
site and found extensive soil and ground water contamination. 58
By 1989 B & B had undertaken some remediation efforts, but had
become insolvent, requiring the DTSC and the EPA to exercise
their authority under section 104 of CERCLA5 9 to clean up the
site and spend more than eight million dollars on remediation. 0
In 1991 the EPA ordered the Railroads to remediate a portion of
the property, and the Railroads sued B & B in the United States
54. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1877.
55. Id. at __ 129 S. Ct. at 1874-75.
56. Id. at , 129 S. Ct. at 1874.
57. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1875 & n.1.
58. Id. at, 129 S. Ct. at 1875.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (2006).
60. BNSF, 556 U.S. at -_, 129 S. Ct. at 1876.
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District Court for the Eastern District of California-an action
that was consolidated with recovery actions by the DTSC and the
EPA against Shell and the Railroads. 61
The district court held that both the Railroads and Shell were
potentially responsible parties ("PRP") under Superfund because
the Railroads owned a portion of the contaminated site and be-
cause Shell had "arranged for" the disposal of hazardous sub-
stances through its sale and delivery of D-D to B & B.6 2 Although
the district court found that the site contamination created a sin-
gle harm, it ruled that the harm was divisible and therefore did
not impose joint and several liability.6 3 Based on
the percentage of the total area of the facility that was owned by the
Railroads, the duration of B & B's business divided by the term of
the Railroads' lease, and the [clourt's determination that only two of
three polluting chemicals spilled on the leased parcel required re-
mediation and that those two chemicals were responsible for roughly
two-thirds of the overall site contamination requiring remediation-
the [district] court apportioned the Railroads' liability as 9% of the
Governments' total response cost.64
The district court also concluded that Shell was liable for six per-
cent of the total cost of remediation based on estimations of spills
of Shell products at the site.65
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the finding that Shell had
"arranger" liability under Superfund, although it noted that Shell
was not a "traditional" arranger under section 107(a)(3) of
CERCLA because it had not contracted with B & B for the dis-
posal of hazardous waste.6 6 Relying on the CERCLA definition of
"disposal," which includes "leaking" and "spilling" of hazardous
substances, 67 the Ninth Circuit found that Shell was liable under
a broader theory of arranger liability because even though the
purpose of Shell's transaction with B & B was not for the disposal
of hazardous waste, disposal was foreseeable because Shell was
aware that some leakage of its product was likely during the
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(3)).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at __ 129 S. Ct. at 1876-77.
66. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1877 (citing United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 520 F.3d 918, 948-50 (9th Cir. 2008)).
67. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3)).
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transfer of its chemicals to B & B, and Shell provided advice and
supervision regarding the safe transfer and storage of its chemi-
cals."'
Regarding apportionment of remediation costs, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concurred with the district court's finding that the costs were
capable of apportionment based on adequate information, but
concluded that the record below did not establish a reasonable
basis for such apportionment.6 9 Because Shell and the Railroads
had the burden of proof regarding apportionment, the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed the district court and held them jointly and several-
ly liable for the government's total remediation costs. 70
In order to determine whether Shell properly could be held lia-
ble as an arranger, the Supreme Court looked to the language of
the statute, noting that CERCLA imposes strict liability for envi-
ronmental contamination upon four broad classes of PRPs set
forth in section 107(a), including any person who arranges for
disposal, treatment, or transport for disposal or treatment of ha-
zardous substances. 71 Given that CERCLA does not specifically
define "what it means to 'arrang[e] for' disposal of a hazardous
substance,"72 the Court gave the term its ordinary meaning and
found that "an entity may qualify as an arranger under §
[107](a)(3) when it takes intentional steps to dispose of a hazard-
ous substance."73 The Court held that in order for Shell to be an
arranger, it "must have entered into the sale of D-D with the in-
tention that at least a portion of the product be disposed of during
the transfer process by one or more of the methods described in §
[103](3)." 74 Since the evidence adduced at trial did not support
such a conclusion, the Court held that Shell was not liable as an
arranger for the contamination. 75
Having decided that Shell was not liable as an arranger under
CERCLA, the Court next addressed whether the Ninth Circuit
erred in reversing the district court's apportionment of the Rail-
68. Id. (citing BNSF, 520 F.3d at 948-50).
69. Id. (citing BNSF, 520 F.3d at 942).
70. Id.
71. See id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1878 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(3)).
72. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 1879 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at __ 129 S. Ct. at 1880.
75. Id.
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roads' liability.7 6 The Court first noted that neither the Railroads
nor the Government cooperated with the district court in "linking
the evidence supporting apportionment to the proper allocation of
the Railroads' liability."77 It then reviewed the figures the district
court used to calculate liability, including the percentage of total
area owned by the Railroads, the duration of B & B's business di-
vided by the Railroads' lease, and the percentage of contamina-
tion caused by the chemicals spilled on the Railroads' parcel, and
determined "that the facts contained in the record reasonably
supported the apportionment of liability."78 Although the Supreme
Court noted that the calculations were imprecise, the fact that
the district court had allowed a fifty percent margin of error for
calculations persuaded it that the district court's determination of
the Railroads' liability was reasonable.79
5. Scope of Sections 404 and 402 of the Clean Water Act
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council,
the final environmental case the Court decided this term, in-
volved questions of whether the EPA or the Army Corps of Engi-
neers ("Corps") had authority to issue a permit under the CWA8°
for the discharge of mining waste and whether the EPA's perfor-
mance standards apply to the discharge of fill material.8' The
Court held that (1) discharges of fill material authorized by the
Corps pursuant to section 404 of the CWA82 do not require per-
mits from the EPA under section 40283 of the statute, and (2) the
EPA's performance standards do not apply to discharges of fill
material regulated by the Corps under section 404. 84 In reaching
its decision, the Court gave deference to a legal interpretation of
relevant sections of the CWA and implementing regulations set
forth in an internal EPA memorandum.8'
76. See id.
77. Id. at __ 129 S. Ct. at 1881-82.
78. Id. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 1882-83.
79. See id. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 1883.
80. Clean Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
81. 557 U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2463 (2009).
82. 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
83. Id. § 1342.
84. Coeur Alaska, 557 U.S. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 2474.
85. See id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2473.
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The dispute in Coeur Alaska arose over a recently revived gold
mine in Alaska that operates a "froth flotation" mill facility to re-
cover gold from crushed rock.86 The process creates a waste called
"slurry," which is a mixture of rock and water."' Rather than
pumping the slurry into a tailings pond, the mine owner, Coeur
Alaska, proposed to pump approximately 4.5 million tons of slur-
ry over the life of the mine into a twenty-three acre lake near the
mine and to discharge lake water into a downstream creek.8s The
proposed discharge would raise the bottom of the lake fifty feet
and would affect fish and aquatic life in the lake.89
The case presented the question of the scope of authority of the
Corps and the EPA over discharges pursuant to sections 404 and
402 of the CWA.90 The Corps regulates the discharge of dredged or
fill material into navigable waters of the United States pursuant
to section 404 through the issuance of permits.91 Regulations im-
plementing section 404 define "fill material" as "material placed
in waters of the United States where the material has the effect
of: (i) Replacing any portion of a water of the United States with
dry land; or (ii) Changing the bottom elevation of any portion of a
water of the United States. '92 Fill material includes rock and
"overburden from mining or other excavation activities,"93 and
"discharge of fill material" refers to the "addition of fill material
into waters of the United States," including the "placement of
overburden, slurry, or tailings or similar mining-related mate-
rials."94
Section 402 of the CWA authorizes the EPA to "issue a permit
for the discharge of any pollutant" from a point source into waters
of the United States except as provided in sections 404 or 318 of
the CWA (relating to aquaculture).95 Under this regulatory pro-
gram, the EPA or a state, like Virginia, that has been delegated
86. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2463-64.
87. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2464.
88. Id.
89. See id. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 2464-65.
90. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2463.
91. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006).
92. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)(1) (2008) (Corps regulation); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (EPA regula-
tion).
93. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2.
94. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(f); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2.
95. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1).
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permitting authority, issues permits with effluent limitations es-
tablished under section 301 of the CWA96 for existing sources and
performance standards under section 306 of the CWA97 for new
sources.98 Notable with respect to this case is that the EPA has
established standards under both sections 301 and 306 that pro-
hibit discharges of process wastewater from certain new froth flo-
tation mills."
Coeur Alaska obtained a section 404 permit from the Corps to
discharge its slurry into the lake and a section 402 permit from
the EPA for discharges from the lake impoundment to a down-
stream creek.100 Several environmental groups and individuals
sued the Corps and some of its officials, arguing that (1) Coeur
Alaska should have been required to obtain a section 402 permit
from the EPA for the slurry discharges rather than a section 404
permit from the Corps; and (2) regardless of which agency issued
the permit, the slurry discharges would violate the EPA's "new
source performance standards" prohibiting froth-flotation mines
from discharging "process wastewater" that includes solid wastes
into navigable waters. 1 1 Coeur Alaska, as well as the State of
Alaska, intervened as defendants. 10 2
The United States District Court for the District of Alaska
granted the defendants summary judgment, but the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and or-
dered the district court to vacate the Corps' permit, finding that
(1) a section 402 permit was required for the slurry discharges,
(2) the Corps lacked authority to issue such a permit under sec-
tion 404, and (3) the proposed discharge would violate the EPA's
new source performance standard.0 3
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, hold-
ing that the Corps, not the EPA, has the authority to issue per-
mits for the slurry discharge.104 Because section 402 authorizes
96. Id. § 1311.
97. Id. § 1316.
98. Id. § 1342.
99. See 40 C.F.R. § 440.104(b)(1) (2007).
100. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. at -, 129 S. Ct.
2458, 2464-65 (2009).
101. Id. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 2466.
102. Id.
103. Id. at , 129 S. Ct. at 2466-67.
104. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2467.
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the EPA to issue "permit[s] for the discharge of any pollutant,"
except as provided in section 404, the Court concluded that the
CWA prohibits the EPA from issuing permits for fill material that
fall under the Corps' section 404 authority115 and that the slurry
discharge constituted fill material under the regulations.106
The Court next considered whether the permit issued by the
Corps was unlawful because the slurry discharge would violate
the EPA's new source performance standard.1 0 7 Noting that the
CWA did not expressly address whether the EPA performance
standard applies to discharges of fill material regulated by the
Corps under section 404, the Court examined the agencies' regu-
lations and found that they did not resolve the issue, as each set
of regulations appeared to "stand on its own without reference to
the other."0s
The Court turned to the agencies' interpretation and applica-
tion of the regulations. It relied on an internal EPA memoran-
dum, which, the Court noted, "though not subject to sufficiently
formal procedures to merit Chevron deference, is entitled to a
measure of deference because it interprets the agencies' own reg-
ulatory scheme."0 9 The Court found that the internal memoran-
dum resolved the matter, explaining that the performance stan-
dard did not apply because the slurry discharge from the mine is
regulated under section 404.110 The Court stated that it would de-
fer to this internal memorandum because it was "not 'plainly er-
roneous or inconsistent with the regulation[s].""1 Five factors in-
formed the Court's decision in this regard: (1) the internal
memorandum confined its scope to closed bodies of water like the
lake at issue and preserved a role for the performance standards
in regulating discharge into surrounding waters; (2) "the
[miemorandum acknowledge[d] that this is not an instance in
which the discharger [is attempting] to evade the requirements of
the EPA's performance standard;" (3) "the [m]emorandum's in-
terpretation preserves the Corps' authority to determine whether
a discharge is in the public interest;" (4) the memorandum does
105. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2006)).
106. See id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2469.
107. See id.
108. Id. at __ 129 S. Ct. at 2471-72.
109. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2473 (citation omitted).
110. Id.
111. Id. (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)).
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not allow toxic pollutants-rather than more innocuous dis-
charges like slurry-to enter navigable waters; and (5) the memo-
randum reconciles sections 306, 402, and 404 of the CWA.112 Ac-
cordingly, the Court reversed the circuit court's decision and
remanded the case for further proceedings.11
B. Cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit
1. Standing
The plaintiff in Stephens v. County of Albemarle presented a
novel claim that two settlement agreements between the opera-
tors of a public landfill-the County of Albemarle, the City of
Charlottesville, and the Rivanna Solid Waste Authority-and
third parties "unconstitutionally conditioned government benefits
on the relinquishment of the third parties' First Amendment
rights to speak freely about the landfill, thereby depriving her
and her husband of their First Amendment rights to receive in-
formation."114 As a result, the plaintiff claimed that the constitu-
tional violation was the proximate cause of the death of her hus-
band, who was the landfill's manager.11 5 He was killed by an
explosion sparked by a cutting torch while cutting old oil storage
tanks in violation of regulations of the federal Occupational Safe-
ty and Health Administration ("OSHA"). 1 6
The plaintiff argued that two settlement agreements between
the defendants and various citizens who lived in the vicinity of
the landfill deprived her of information relating to the landfill be-
cause the citizens agreed, inter alia, not to make adverse private
or public comments about the landfill and to excise language from
112. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2473-74. The environmental groups argued that the Court
should not accord the internal memorandum any deference, noting that the memorandum
contradicted the agencies' prior published statements and practice. Id. at -, 129 S. Ct. at
2474. Although the Court considered the environmental groups' arguments, the Court
found that the memorandum was not inconsistent with the agencies' published state-
ments, and two instances in which the Corps had issued a section 404 permit authorizing
a mine to discharge solid waste as fill material indicated that the memorandum did not
contravene established practice. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2474-77.
113. Id. at -, 129 S. Ct. at 2477.
114. See 524 F.3d 485, 486 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 404 (2008).
115. Id. at 486-87.
116. Id. at 487.
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their websites relating to the landfill. 7 She contended that but
for these agreements, the settling citizens would have monitored
landfill activities, discovered that the OSHA regulations were be-
ing violated, and disseminated such information to her and her
husband, which would have prevented her husband's death.11 8
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants,
but on appeal the Fourth Circuit vacated that ruling and re-
manded the case for dismissal on the grounds that the plaintiff
lacked standing because her allegations of injury were too specul-
ative. "9 The court acknowledged 'that the Constitution protects
the right to receive information and ideas from a willing speak-
er,"' but to have standing to assert that right, "a plaintiff must
show that there exists a speaker willing to convey the information
to her."1 20 While the plaintiff established that at least one of the
settling third parties would have been willing to speak about
matters covered by the speech restriction, she did not offer any
evidence that this speaker would have discussed the landfill with
her or her husband in the absence of the agreements.21 Addition-
ally, plaintiff did not demonstrate any relationship with these
third parties to establish an expectation that she would have re-
ceived whatever landfill information they may have possessed but
for the settlement agreements.12
2. More on Sections 404 and 402 of the Clean Water Act
Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Aracoma Coal Co.
("OVEC") is a West Virginia mining case in which environmental
groups challenged the issuance of four permits by the Corps al-
lowing streams to be filled in twenty-three locations in conjunc-
tion with surface coal mining operations. 123 Given that surface
mining activities in Virginia also typically involve such "valley
117. Id. at 488, 490.
118. Id. at 490.
119. Id. at 490, 493.
120. Id. at 491, 492 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
121. Id. at 492.
122. Id.
123. 556 F.3d 177, 185-87 (4th Cir. 2008).
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fill" permits,2 4 this case is relevant to mining operations in the
Commonwealth as well.
Finding that the permits violated the CWA, NEPA,115 and the
Administrative Procedure Act, 121 the district court rescinded the
permits, enjoined all activities under them, and remanded to the
Corps for further proceedings.2 7 Pursuant to NEPA, the Corps
prepared EAs for each permit and concluded "that the permitted
activity would not result in significant environmental impacts
[due to] the planned mitigation."128 The district court agreed with
the environmental groups that significant individual and cumula-
tive effects of the projects warranted the preparation of EISs un-
der NEPA rather than EAs.129 Similarly, the district court found
that the Corps violated section 404 of the CWA and the Corps'
implementing guidelines by failing to determine the adverse indi-
vidual and cumulative environmental impacts of the permitted
actions 130
In a subsequent order, the district court held that the stream
segments linking the permitted fills to sediment treatment ponds
were waters of the United States under the CWA and that the
Corps did not have legal authority under section 404 of the CWA
to permit discharges from the fills to stream segments. 3' Rather,
the district court held that, for the discharges from the fills to the
stream segments, the applicants would need to obtain a section
402 permit from the EPA or an EPA-approved state agency. 132
This issue regarding the relationship between sections 404 and
402 of the CWA is similar to the issue addressed later in the year
by the Supreme Court in Coeur Alaska.1 3
The Fourth Circuit reversed and vacated the district court's
rescission of the permits and injunction, and reversed its declara-
tory judgment.3 4 Granting deference to the Corps' interpretation
124. See VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-234(A) (Repl. Vol. 2002).
125. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2006).
126. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521.
127. OVEC, 556 F.3d at 186.
128. Id. at 187.
129. Id. at 187-88.
130. See id. at 188.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See discussion supra Part II.A.5.
134. OVEC, 556 F.3d at 217.
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of its regulations that its jurisdiction was limited to affected wa-
ters and adjacent riparian areas, the court found that the Corps
has "no legal authority to prevent the placement of fill material in
areas outside of the waters of the United States" and that any
other fill activity was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the West
Virginia Department of Environmental Protection, pursuant to
its authority under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act.135 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit agreed that the Corps did
not have sufficient control and responsibility over all aspects of
the valley fill projects to require that the Corps consider the envi-
ronmental consequences beyond the filling of jurisdictional wa-
ters of the greater valley fill projects in its NEPA analysis. 13 6
The Fourth Circuit also found that for each of the four permits,
the Corps had sufficiently supported its mitigated Finding of No
Significant Impact under NEPA and its finding of no significant
degradation to waters of the United States under the CWA 37
Noting that the arguments presented by the environmental
groups relied heavily upon expert scientific testimony, the court
emphasized that once it determined that the Corps' method of as-
sessing the function of streams was not arbitrary and capricious,
it should give deference to the Corps' findings: "When presented
with conflicting evidence, courts must generally defer to the
agency evaluation because 'an agency must have discretion to re-
ly on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if,
as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more
persuasive."138
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit found that the mitigation plans
required by the Corps, as well as cumulative impacts analysis,
complied with Corps regulations and guidance documents and de-
ferred to the Corps with respect to its conclusion that proposed
stream creation measures had a likelihood of success. 39
Again deferring to the Corps' interpretation of the CWA and its
own implementing regulations, the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court's order for declaratory relief, concluding that the
stream segments linking the fills to the sediment ponds, together
135. Id. at 194.
136. Id. at 195, 197.
137. Id. at 197, 209.
138. Id. at 201 (quoting Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989)).
139. Id. at 205-06, 207, 209.
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with the sediment ponds, "are unitary 'waste treatment systems,'
not 'waters of the United States."'10 The court concluded that the
Corps' interpretation, which was based on a 2006 letter from the
EPA construing its own regulatory definition of waters of the
United States and waste treatment systems, was not adopted
simply for the purpose of litigation but reflected the fair and con-
sidered judgment of both the EPA and the Corps on the issue.'
Accordingly, the court held that the Corps did not exceed its sec-
tion 404 permitting authority with respect to permitting the dis-
charge of fill sediment into stream segments that link the fill to
sediment ponds downstream.'
C. United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia'4
United States v. Savoy Senior Housing Corp. involved the issue
of whether a defendant may seek contribution for civil penalties
imposed for violations of the CWA. 4 4 The United States filed a
complaint in 2006 against six defendants for illegally discharging
dredged or fill material into wetlands without a permit in viola-
tion of section 404 of the CWA, as well as illegal discharge of pol-
lutants into waters of the United States without a permit. 41 The
Government sought injunctive relief and civil penalties for the al-
leged violations, which occurred during the construction of a
failed development project called the Liberty Village Site
("Site").146
Some of the defendants filed a third-party complaint in 2007
against one of the partners in Liberty Village Associates LP that
owned the Site. 7 In 2008, one of the defendants filed a second
third-party complaint against three new entities and seven indi-
140. Id. at 209.
141. Id. at 214.
142. Id. at 216.
143. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia did not decide
any environmental cases of note during 2008 or the first half of 2009.
144. (Savoy II), No. 6:06cv00031, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79017, at *2 (W.D. Va. Oct. 7,
2008).
145. United States v. Savoy Senior Hous. Corp. (Savoy 1), No. 6:06cv031, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17850, at *3 (W.D. Va. Mar. 6, 2008) (discussing alleged violations of the
CWA).
146. Id.
147. Savoy 11, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79017, at *2-3.
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viduals for contribution and negligence. 14s The district court con-
cluded that the third-party complaint failed to allege any facts
supporting the contention that any of the defendants were in-
volved in the development of the Site or the deposition of mate-
rials into wetlands or streams on the Site.'49
Beyond addressing the failure to plead facts that could support
a contribution claim against any of the third-party defendants,
the district court also determined that the CWA does not permit a
private party to seek contribution for civil penalties that may be
imposed for CWA violations. 150 The district court noted that with
respect to a federal statute, a right to contribution arises only
through (1) the express or implied creation of a right of action by
Congress or (2) creation of a common law right of contribution by
federal courts. 151 It then concluded that there is no express or im-
plied right of action for contribution under the CWA and that fed-
eral courts consistently have refused to create a federal common
law right of contribution. 152 Then, the district court rejected the
third-party plaintiffs argument that his contribution claim arose
under Virginia law rather than federal common law and found
that the savings clause of the CWA applies on its face to the citi-
zen suit provision of the statute and does not purport to authorize
contribution claims. 153
Accordingly, the district court refused to allow the third-party
plaintiff to rely on Virginia's contribution statute and denied his
motion for leave to file the third-party complaint. 15 Ultimately, a
consent decree was negotiated between the Government and de-
fendants that imposed a civil penalty, required the restoration of
certain areas on and adjacent to the Site, and required the fund-
ing of off-site mitigation through the purchase of credits from re-
gional stream and wetland restoration banks. 15
148. Savoy 1, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17850, at *3-4, 7-9.
149. Id. at *10.
150. Id. at *26.
151. Id. at *17 (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 638
(1981)).
152. Id. at *17-18.
153. Id. at *18, 24-25.
154. Id. at *24-25, 26.
155. Notice of Lodging Proposed Consent Decree, 74 Fed. Reg. 2101 (Jan. 14, 2009).
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D. Virginia Cases56
1. What Constitutes a Materials Recovery Facility?
Frederick County Business Park, L.L.C. v. Virginia Department
of Environmental Quality involved the question of what type of
facility requires a permit as a "materials recovery facility"
("MRF") pursuant to the Virginia Solid Waste Management Regu-
lations.157 The regulations define an MRF as "a solid waste man-
agement facility for the collection, processing and recovery of ma-
terial such as metals from solid waste or for the production of a
fuel from solid waste." 8
The Supreme Court of Virginia granted deference to the Virgin-
ia Department of Environmental Quality's ("DEQ") interpretation
of its regulations in upholding the agency's determination that a
facility was an MRF rather than a recycling center and that it
therefore required a permit under the regulations. 159 Plaintiff
planned to collect construction waste primarily from new residen-
tial construction sites, transport the materials to its facility, and
separate the materials that could be recycled from the materials
that would need to be disposed of at a permitted landfill. 6' It es-
timated that approximately seventy percent of the materials
sorted at the proposed facility would be recyclable.' 6' Plaintiff
maintained that it was a recycling facility and brought suit chal-
lenging the DEQ's determination that the facility required a per-
156. Note that two unreported Court of Appeals of Virginia cases involving environ-
mental issues were decided in 2008 and 2009. See State Water Control Bd. v. Captain's
Cove Util. Co., No. 2375-07-1, 2008 Va. App. LEXIS 375 (Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2008) (unpub-
lished decision) (upholding State Water Control Board decision to deny VPDES permit for
sewage treatment plant); Mirant Potomac River, LLC v. Commonwealth, No. 2067-08-2,
2009 Va. App. LEXIS 287 (Ct. App. June 23, 2009) (unpublished decision) (holding that
challenged regulation of the State Air Pollution Control Board establishing cap and trade
program for nitrogen oxide was ultra vires). Petitions for appeal were filed in both cases.
Unpublished court of appeals opinions have no precedential value unless the Supreme
Court of Virginia denies a petition for appeal and the grounds for the denial can be dis-
cerned from the four corners of the court's order. Sheets v. Castle, 263 Va. 407, 412, 559
S.E.2d 616, 619 (2002). Given the potential significance of the Mirant case, the disposition
of the petition for appeal merits close monitoring.
157. 278 Va. 207, 209, 677 S.E.2d 42, 43 (2009) (citing 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 20-80-10
to 20-80-730 (2004)).
158. 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-80-10.
159. Frederick County Bus. Park, 278 Va. at 210, 212, 677 S.E.2d at 44-45.
160. Id. at 209, 677 S.E.2d at 43.
161. Id.
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mit as an MRF because it would receive 'mixed wastes for on-site
processing into recyclable and unrecyclable fractions.""162
Both the circuit court and court of appeals ruled for the DEQ,
finding that the record supported the agency's factual finding
that thirty percent of the materials that would be brought to the
proposed facility would not be recyclable and, therefore, that the
DEQ's finding that the facility met the regulatory definition of an
MRF was not arbitrary or capricious. 1 3 On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Virginia, the plaintiff continued to argue that the facility
was a recycling facility exempt from permitting requirements per
Virginia Code section 10.1-1408.1(J)& and that the materials that
would be separated at the facility fell within exemptions to the
regulatory definition of solid waste under the Virginia Solid
Waste Management Regulations.169 The DEQ countered that con-
struction waste falls within the definition of solid waste and the
sorting of construction waste into recyclable material and solid
waste is an activity that falls squarely within the regulatory defi-
nition of an MRF. 6 6 Additionally, the DEQ stressed that thirty
percent of the material sorted at the facility will be non-recyclable
construction waste that must be disposed of at a permitted dis-
posal facility. 167
The supreme court upheld the lower courts, applying a "sub-
stantial evidence" standard6 8 and reiterating the bedrock prin-
ciple that, in a case involving an interpretation within the specia-
lized knowledge of an agency vested by the General Assembly
with discretion to interpret and apply regulations, a court will re-
verse an agency decision "only for arbitrary or capricious action
that constitutes a clear abuse of the agency's delegated discre-
162. Id. at 209-10, 677 S.E.2d at 44 (quoting 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-80-10)).
163. Id. at 210, 677 S.E.2d at 44 (citing Frederick County Bus. Park, LLC v. Va. Dep't
of Envtl. Quality, 52 Va. App. 40, 52, 660 S.E.2d 698, 704 (Ct. App. 2008)).
164. Under the statute, no permit is required for recycling facilities or "for temporary
storage incidental to recycling." VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1408.1(J) (Cum. Supp. 2009). This
provision defines "recycling" as "any process whereby material which would otherwise be
solid waste is used or reused, or prepared for use or reuse, as an ingredient in an industri-
al process to make a product, or as an effective substitute for a commercial product." Id.
165. Frederick County Bus. Park, 278 Va. at 210, 677 S.E.2d at 44.
166. Id. (quoting 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-80-10).
167. Id. at 210-11, 667 S.E.2d at 44.
168. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4027 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Supp. 2009) (stating that a court
must uphold an agency's factual findings if the record contains substantial evidence sup-
porting those findings).
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tion."169 The court noted that DEQ has statutory authority to re-
gulate, supervise, and control solid waste management activities,
and, with respect to plaintiff's facility, the DEQ had to reconcile
and harmonize various provisions relating to recycling and solid
waste management because no statute or regulation squarely ad-
dressed the requirements for a facility that handles both recycla-
ble and non-recyclable materials."' The supreme court concluded
that the DEQ's conclusion was not arbitrary or capricious because
to adopt plaintiffs interpretation would require exemption from
permitting requirements for any solid waste management facility
that receives some materials that will be separated for recycling
or reuse.
171
2. Standing
In Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel.
Virginia State Water Control Board, the Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia reversed the dismissal for lack of standing of an environ-
mental group's petition appealing the extension and modification
of a Virginia Water Protection Permit ("VWP Permit") previously
issued to the City of Newport News for the construction and oper-
ation of a reservoir in King William County."' The court found
that the group did allege facts that, when accepted as true for
purposes of surviving demurrer and together with all reasonable
inferences flowing from them, sufficiently established that the ex-
tension of the VWP Permit caused an actual or imminent injury
to the group. 73
The VWP Permit at the center of the case was originally issued
in 1997 by the State Water Control Board ("Water Control
Board") to the City of Newport News ("City") for the construction
and operation of a reservoir. 74 The VWP permit, which was set to
expire in December 2007, authorized the destruction of 437 acres
of wetlands; required compensatory wetlands mitigation through
the creation of new wetlands at a two to one ratio; required pro-
169. Frederick County Bus. Park, 278 Va. at 211, 677 S.E.2d at 44-45 (citing VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.2-4027 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Supp. 2009)).
170. Id., 677 S.E.2d at 45.
171. Id. at 212, 677 S.E.2d at 45.
172. 52 Va. App. 807, 812, 667 S.E.2d 844, 847 (Ct. App. 2008).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 813, 667 S.E.2d at 847-48.
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tection of minimum instream flows in the Mattaponi Reservoir;
and required various studies and plans relating to habitat evalu-
ation, wetland mitigation, and ecosystem and salinity monitor-
ing.7 5 Plaintiffs and others filed a state court challenge to the is-
suance of the original VWP Permit, which they lost.176
In 2005 the Corps issued the City a section 404 permit, and the
plaintiffs and other parties challenged the issuance of the permit
in federal court.7 7 Because delays caused by the state and federal
litigation would prevent completion of construction of the reser-
voir and completion of the required studies before its expiration
in December 2007, the City requested a five-year extension of the
VWP Permit.17s Although the DEQ had recommended that the
Water Control Board grant the extension, the board denied the
City's request, at which point the City filed a petition for a formal
administrative hearing.179 While that petition was pending, the
city manager wrote a letter requesting that the Water Control
Board reconsider its denial and grant a permit extension only to
allow the City to complete the required plans and studies.180 The
city manager stated that the City would agree to a condition pro-
hibiting construction of the reservoir under the extension.,, The
Water Control Board accepted the request, granting a "modifica-
tion" of the permit and an extension until December 2010 unless
a complete application for reissuance of the permit was submitted
by that date."2
Plaintiff filed a request for a formal hearing in front of the Wa-
ter Control Board, a notice of appeal, and then a petition for ap-
peal of the issuance of the modified permit. 3 The federal suit
challenging the section 404 permit also was pending when plain-
tiff filed its petition for appeal.1"
175. Id. at 813-14, 667 S.E.2d at 848.
176. Id. at 814, 667 S.E.2d at 848.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 815, 667 S.E.2d at 848.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 815-16, 667 S.E.2d at 848-49.
181. Id. at 816, 667 S.E.2d at 849.
182. Id. at 816-17, 667 S.E.2d at 849. If a complete permit renewal application, includ-
ing a final mitigation plan, was submitted by December 21, 2010, the permit would expire
on December 21, 2012.
183. Id. at 817, 667 S.E.2d at 849.
184. Id. at 814, 667 S.E.2d at 848.
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In the petition, the plaintiff challenged the process by which
the Water Control Board modified and extended the permit and
also requested that the circuit court set aside the extension and
remand to the board to reinstate its denial of the extension, con-
duct a formal hearing regarding the extension, and comply with
the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, the State
Water Control Law, and applicable regulations.185 The Common-
wealth and the City demurred, arguing that plaintiff lacked
standing because it suffered no harm from the extension. 8 6 Plain-
tiff responded that the manner in which the Water Control Board
reconsidered its denial of the permit extension inflicted procedur-
al harm sufficient to establish Article III standing. 187
Focusing on the fact that the permit extension did not allow the
City to undertake any actions that it otherwise could without a
permit, the circuit court agreed that plaintiff did not have stand-
ing because it did not show that it had suffered an actual or im-
minent injury. 8 8 The circuit court did not address the other two
prongs of Article III standing-causation and redressability.189
The court of appeals reversed the dismissal of the petition,
finding that plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to establish
standing to sue in its own right as well as in a representational
capacity. 190 First, the court concluded that plaintiff had sufficient-
ly alleged injury in fact relating to the Board's reconsideration of
its denial of the extension and the fact that the modified and ex-
tended permit did allow construction or site preparation for con-
struction to the extent necessary to complete the studies and
plans required by the permit. 9' With respect to the latter, the
court noted that the petition alleged that the activities would de-
stroy natural resources and impair the aesthetic value of the af-
fected rivers as educational resources. 92
Relying on the same two points, the court of appeals also con-
cluded that plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded causation. 19 The
185. Id. at 817, 667 S.E.2d at 849.
186. Id., 667 S.E.2d at 849-50.
187. Id. at 818, 667 S.E.2d at 850.
188. Id. at 819-20, 667 S.E.2d at 850-51.
189. Id. at 822 n.2, 667 S.E.2d at 852 n.2.
190. Id. at 829, 833, 667 S.E.2d at 855, 857.
191. Id. at 824, 667 S.E.2d at 853.
192. Id. at 825, 667 S.E.2d at 853.
193. Id. at 827-28, 667 S.E.2d at 854-55.
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court noted that, although revocation of the VWP Permit would
not necessarily force the Corps to revoke the section 404 permit,
it might be a factor for the Corps to consider in deciding whether
to revoke or modify the federal permit.1 94 Finally, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts supporting a find-
ing that a favorable decision by the court would likely redress the
alleged injury.195 The court of appeals found that setting aside the
modified permit and requiring "sufficient process," such as a for-
mal hearing, would redress plaintiffs allegation of harm.196 Addi-
tionally, the court noted that, even though the City may have un-
dertaken the activities authorized by the permit even in its
absence, the City had conceded that it would not likely do so in
the absence of the extension.197 The court of appeals concluded by
finding that essentially the same alleged facts supported the
plaintiffs standing to sue on behalf of its members in a represen-
tational capacity, given the additional allegations that some of its
members were affected individually because they used the natu-
ral resources that would be harmed by activities authorized by
the modified and extended permit. 19 8
The Commonwealth filed a petition for appeal to the Supreme
Court of Virginia, which granted review in April 2009.199 The limi-
tation on standing for procedural injuries articulated last term by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Summers200 could come
into play in the Supreme Court of Virginia's consideration of this
appeal. As of September 2009, a decision is pending.201
194. Id. at 828, 667 S.E.2d at 855.
195. Id. at 828-29, 667 S.E.2d at 855.
196. Id. at 829, 667 S.E.2d at 855.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 831-33, 667 S.E.2d at 856-57.
199. Appeals Granted, http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/appeals/082384.html
(last visited Oct. 11, 2009). The appeal has been assigned Case No. 082384. Id.
200. See discussion supra at Part II.A.2.
201. See Appeals Granted, http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/appeals/home.html
(last visited Oct. 11, 2009). However, Newport News officials recently decided to terminate
the King William County reservoir project, potentially raising questions of mootness. See
Reservoir Fight Ends on Peninsula, VA. PILOT, Sept. 26, 2009, at 6.
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III. 2008-2009 LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN VIRGINIA 20 2
A. 2008 Legislative Session
1. Most "Green" Legislation Failed to Pass
The 2008 Session of the Virginia General Assembly marked the
introduction and failure of numerous "green" initiatives. Several
bills relating to climate change were introduced, but none passed.
For example, House Bill 793 would have required the Secretary of
Natural Resources to develop a comprehensive plan by January 1,
2010, to reduce 2005 greenhouse gas emission levels by thirty
percent by 2025 and eighty percent by 2050. 203 House Bill 1230
would have required the State Air Pollution Control Board to
adopt regulations requiring the annual reporting and verification
of direct emissions of greenhouse gases from any stationary
source that emits more than a de minimis amount of greenhouse
gases on an annual basis and otherwise is already required to re-
port emissions of air pollutants. 20 4 Senate Bill 446 would have
mandated that, by July 1, 2020, a minimum of twenty percent of
the electric energy sold by suppliers to retail customers in Virgin-
ia must be generated from renewable generation energy
sources .205
Senate Bill 447 would have required the design of all major
building projects of state agencies on state-owned land to meet
the standards of the U.S. Green Building Council's Leadership in
Energy and Environmental Design ("LEED") Building Rating
System or the Green Building Initiative's Green Globes building
rating system.2 6 The General Assembly, however, did enact legis-
lation expanding the definition of energy-efficient buildings that
may be classified as a separate class of real property for tax pur-
poses to include buildings that meet performance guidelines or
standards under the Green Globes building rating system, LEED,
EarthCraft House program, or Energy Star program.0 7
202. There have been no major changes to federal environmental statutes during this
period.
203. H.B. 793, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
204. H.B. 1230, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
205. S.B. 446, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
206. S.B. 447, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
207. Act of Mar. 4, 2008, ch. 288, 2008 Va. Acts 431 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
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2. Significant Environmental Bills Enacted
The 2008 General Assembly passed an Act establishing a uni-
form permit issuance process for the Air Pollution Control Board
and the Water Control Board. 208 After issuing a public notice of a
pending permit action, a public hearing must be held if at least
twenty-five people have requested a hearing and the director of
the DEQ finds that the issues raised are germane to the permit
action and are not inconsistent with state or federal laws.209 Each
board is required to act on the permit within ninety days of the
close of the comment period unless the applicant agrees to an ex-
tension of the time period.210 When the Board decides to adopt the
recommendation of the DEQ regarding a permit application, it
"shall provide in writing a clear and concise statement of the legal
basis and justification for the decision reached."211 If the board de-
viates from the DEQ recommendation, it must, "in consultation
with legal counsel, provide a clear and concise statement explain-
ing the reason for the variation and how the [bloard's decision is
in compliance with applicable laws and regulations."212 Addition-
ally, the Act increases the membership on the Air Pollution Con-
trol Board from five to seven members and changes a qualifica-
tion of the members so that no member can be a current employee
of an entity subject to a permit or enforce-ment order of the Air
Pollution Control Board.21 3 Qualifications for membership on the
Water Control Board and the Virginia Waste Management Board
are also changed to require that the members, by their education,
training, or experience, be knowledgeable of water quality or
waste management, respectively, and must be fairly representa-
tive of public health, conservation, business, and agriculture 4.21
ANN. § 58.1-3221.2(A), (C) (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
208. Act of Mar. 11, 2008, ch. 557, 2008 Va. Acts 828 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-
1322.01 (Cum. Supp. 2008); id. § 62.1-44.15:02 (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
209. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1322.01(C)(1)-(3) (Cum. Supp. 2009); id. § 62.1-
44.15:02(C)(1)-(3) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
210. Id. § 10.1-1322.01(N) (Cum. Supp. 2009); id. § 62.1-44.15:02(N) (Cum. Supp.
2009).
211. Id. § 10.1-1322.01(P) (Cum. Supp. 2009); id. § 62.1-44.15:02(P) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
212. Id. § 10.1-1322.01(P) (Cum. Supp. 2009); id. § 62.1-44.15:02(P) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
213. Act of Mar. 11, 2008, ch. 557, 2008 Va. Acts 828 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 10.1-1301, 10.1-1302 (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
214. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1401(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008); id. §
62.1-44.9(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
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The General Assembly also passed an Act to amend Virginia
Code section 62.1-44.15:21, creating an exemption from the re-
quirement to obtain a VWP Permit for impacts to state waters
(including wetlands) caused by the construction or maintenance
of farm or stock ponds and impoundments that do not fall under
the authority of the Virginia Soil and Water Conservation
Board.2 15 As discussed in Part IV, infra regarding regulatory de-
velopments, in October 2008 the DEQ issued guidance to interp-
ret this exemption.
With respect to stormwater pollution, local governments classi-
fied as MS4 stormwater localities are now authorized to enact or-
dinances to enforce stormwater permits.2 16 Such localities may en-
force the permits through civil charges and penalties and
injunctive relief.2'7 Any person who willingly and knowingly vi-
olates the ordinance is subject to prosecution for a Class 1 mis-
demeanor.21
Finally, the General Assembly passed two Acts to amend Vir-
ginia Code section 10.1-1188 to increase the threshold project cost
triggering the requirement of preparation of an environmental
impact report for a major state project.219 The first Act requires
the preparation of an environmental impact report in connection
with the acquisition of an interest in land for the construction of a
state facility, including the construction of a new facility or ex-
pansion of an existing facility undertaken by any state agency, if
the cost is $500,000 or more.220 The threshold amount requiring
such a report under the prior statute was $100,000.221 Similarly,
the second Act sets a $500,000 threshold for requiring the prepa-
ration of an environmental impact report for any state or local
highway construction, reconstruction, or improvement project. 22
215. Act of Mar. 3, 2008, ch. 244, 2008 Va. Acts 361 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 62.1-44.15:21(14) (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
216. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-603.14:1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
217. Id.
218. Id. § 10.1-603.14:1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
219. Act of Feb. 28, 2008, ch. 45, 2008 Va. Acts 43 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 10.1-1188(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008)); Act of Mar. 3, 2008, ch. 225, 2008 Va. Acts 337
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1188(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
220. Act of Mar. 3, 2008, ch. 225, 2008 Va. Acts 337 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 10.1-1188(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
221. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1188(A) (Supp. 2007).
222. Act of Feb. 28, 2008, ch. 45, 2008 Va. Acts 43 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 10.1-1188(A) (Cum. Supp. 2008)).
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B. 2009 Legislative Session
Notwithstanding (or perhaps because of) the failure of numer-
ous bills relating to climate change in the 2008 Session of the
General Assembly, Governor Kaine launched "Renew Virginia" in
December 2008, which is an initiative to promote renewable
energy, create green jobs, and encourage environmental protec-
tion.221 Also in December 2008, the Governor's Commission on
Climate Change ("Commission") issued its final report ("Final
Report").224 The Commission, which Governor Kaine established
in December 2007 with Executive Order 59, was charged with as-
sessing the likely impacts of climate change on Virginia's natural
resources, economy, and public health and with proposing strate-
gies to meet the Governor's goal of reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions in Virginia by thirty percent of projected 2025 levels.225
The Final Report offered roughly one hundred recommenda-
tions, some of which can be implemented by the executive, some
requiring new legislation by the General Assembly, and some
that only the federal government can establish. 226 Recommenda-
tions included actions aimed at reducing greenhouse gas ("GHG")
emissions, increasing energy efficiency, improving transportation
system efficiency, and increasing the percentage of electricity
generated by emissions-free sources.227 Other recommendations
focused on steps the Commonwealth should take to prepare for
and adapt to impacts of climate change that are likely and un-
avoidable, such as educating the public and reviewing "state
agency and local government authority to account for climate
change in their actions."228
Such recommendations, coupled with Renew Virginia and the
Virginia Energy Plan, served as the platform for the passage of
several bills related to climate change, renewable energy, and
223. Press Release, Office of the Governor Timothy M. Kaine, Governor Kaine An-
nounces Review Virginia Initiative (Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://www.governor.virgin
ia.gov/MediaRelations/NewsReleases/viewRelease.cfm?id=832.
224. L. PRESTON BRYANT, JR., GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FINAL RE-
PORT: A CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN 1 (Dec. 15, 2008), http:/www.deq.virginia.gov/ex
port/sitesdefault/info/documentsclimate/CCC Final Report-Final 12152008.pdf.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 12-38.
227. Id. at 8, 15, 21.
228. Id. at 32-33, 38.
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other renewable resources in the 2009 General Assembly Session,
many of which create financial or regulatory incentives to en-
courage desired activities. The following is a summary of some of
the most significant bills enacted.
The General Assembly enacted legislation to create incentives
for green roof construction. The first Act adds Virginia Code sec-
tion 58.1-3852, which authorizes localities to enact ordinances
creating incentives or providing regulatory flexibility to "encour-
age the use of green roofs in the construction, repair, or remodel-
ding of residential and commercial buildings."2 29 These ordinances
may include a reduction in permit fees, a streamlined process for
approval of building permits, or a reduction in any gross receipts
tax on green roof contractors. 2 ° The second Act provides similar
amendments to Virginia Code sections 15.2-5101 and 15.2-5114
and adds section 15.2-977. 211
The General Assembly passed legislation that increases the
goal for investor-owned incumbent electric utilities to have fifteen
percent of their total electric energy sales in the base year from
renewable energy sources in calendar year 2025.232 Previously,
one of these utilities could participate in the voluntary renewable
energy portfolio standard program if it demonstrated that it had
a reasonable expectation of achieving twelve percent of its base
year electric energy sales from certain renewable energy sources
during the calendar year 2022.233 A participating utility that
meets the new, higher specified percentage goal is eligible for per-
formance incentives that increase the fair combined rate of return
on common equity and provide an enhanced rate of return on
costs associated with the construction of renewable energy gener-
ation facilities.234
The General Assembly also amended the Biofuels Production
Incentive Grant Program ("Program") to provide a greater incen-
229. Act of Feb. 23, 2009, ch. 17, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-
3852(B) (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
230. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3852(C) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
231. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 402, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-
977(B) (Supp. 2009)) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.2-5101, 15.2-5114(10)
(Supp. 2009)).
232. Act of Mar. 30, 2009, ch. 744, 2009 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 56-585.2(B), (D) (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
233. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.2(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
234. See id. § 56-585.2(C), (E) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
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tive for "advanced biofuels" that are made from winter cover
crops, cellulose, hemicellulose, lignin oil, and algae over those
"standard biofuels" made from agricultural feedstocks such as
corn.135 The Program will award a $0.125 per gallon grant for ad-
vanced biofuels and a $0.10 per gallon grant for standard biofuels
and require the production of one million gallons of biofuels per
year for eligibility.236 The purpose of the amendment evidently is
to encourage the development of biofuels that do not affect food
supply or feed/food prices.
The General Assembly passed legislation to encourage agricul-
tural waste-to-energy production by excluding farmers who own
and operate facilities that use waste-to-energy technology (includ-
ing methane digesters) to generate electricity from regulation as
public utilities, public service corporations, public service compa-
nies, or "manufacturers" under any provision of the Virginia
Code.237 To be eligible for the exclusion, a person or entity must
obtain at least fifty-one percent of "annual gross income from its
agricultural operations and produce[ I] the agricultural waste used
as feedstock" in the generation of the electricity. 238 Such electric
generators will be permitted to connect to the electric grid in ac-
cordance with regulations to be promulgated by the State Corpo-
ration Commission.239
The Mid-Atlantic Offshore Wind Energy Infrastructure Devel-
opment Compact ("Compact") was created by the General Assem-
bly in 2009. 240 States that will be parties to the Compact are Vir-
ginia, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York, and the
purposes of the Compact are to (1) "study, develop, and promote
coordinated research and planning of the design, construction,
utility interconnection, financing, and operation of offshore wind
energy infrastructure and operations directly adjacent to the
shores of the party states"; (2) coordinate federal, state, and local
235. Act of Feb. 23, 2009, ch. 19, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 45.1-394(A)-(B) (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
236. VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-394(B) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
237. Act of Mar. 30, 2009, ch. 746, 2009 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 1-
222.1 (Cum. Supp. 2009); id. § 56-265.1 (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
238. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-222.1 (Cum. Supp. 2009); id. § 56-265.1(b)(10)(i) (Cum. Supp.
2009).
239. Id. § 56-594.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
240. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 316, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-
6000 (Supp. 2009)).
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government efforts; and (3) seek funding.241 The compact provides
for a board with five representatives from each party state, three
of whom are to be appointed by the Governor, one by the Speaker
of the House of Delegates, and one by the Senate of Virginia. 42
The measure will take effect upon enactment by Virginia and
three of the other named states.243
In the same vein, the General Assembly passed an Act to au-
thorize the Marine Resources Commission to lease subaqueous
lands to persons or entities that generate "electrical energy from
wave or tidal action, currents, offshore winds, or thermal or salin-
ity gradients and transmit energy from such sources to shore"
and mandates that any such leases require a royalty.2 4 All royal-
ties collected will be appropriated to the Virginia Coastal Energy
Research Consortium.245 The legislation also directs the Marine
Resources Commission to "(i) identify 100 acres suitable for use
by the Virginia Coastal Energy Research Consortium as a re-
search site; and (ii) determine whether sufficient and appropriate
subaqueous lands exist. . . to support ... [a commercial] offshore
[wind farm]" and, if so, offer it for development in a lease auc-
tion.246
Of the environmental laws enacted in 2009 that do not relate to
renewable energy, the Act creating a program for stormwater
nonpoint nutrient runoff offsets247 may be the most significant.
This legislation authorizes permit issuing authorities (including
any locality that has adopted a local stormwater management
program) to allow stormwater permit holders to comply with non-
point nutrient runoff water quality criteria by acquiring nonpoint
nutrient offsets that have been certified under the Chesapeake
Bay Watershed Nutrient Exchange Program.2 48 The offsets must
be in the same tributary as the permitted activity and generated
in the same or adjacent eight digit hydrologic unit code, except
241. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-6000 (Supp. 2009).
242. Id. § 2.2-6000 art. III(A) (Supp. 2009).
243. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 316, 2009 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-
6000, art. IV, cl. 2 (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
244. Act of Mar. 30, 2009, ch. 766, 2009 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 28.2-1208(A) (Repl. Vol. 2009)).
245. VA. CODE ANN. § 28.2-1208(C) (Repl. Vol. 2009).
246. Id. § 28.2-1208 ed. note (Repl. Vol. 2009).
247. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 364, 2009 Va. Acts _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 10.2-
603.8:1 (Cum. Supp. 2009)).
248. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-603.8:1(A)-(B) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
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under limited circumstances. 249 The legislation further states that
the
permit issuing authority may allow the use of nonpoint nutrient off-
sets when the permit applicant demonstrates... that (i) alternative
site designs have been considered that may accommodate on-site
best management practices ["BMPs"], (ii) on-site [BMPs] have been
considered in alternative site designs .... (iii) appropriate on-site
[BMPs] will be implemented, and (iv) full compliance with postdeve-
lopment nonpoint nutrient runoff compliance requirements cannot
practicably be met on site.
2
1
0
The legislation also requires an offset broker to pay the permit is-
suing authority a fee equal to six percent of the amount paid by
the permittee for the offsets. 251
IV. 2008-2009 REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
A. Federal Regulatory Developments of Particular Significance to
the Commonwealth
1. New Wetlands Compensatory Mitigation Rule
For the past two decades, the Corps and the EPA have focused
on three aspects of mitigation: avoidance of destruction, minimi-
zation of impacts, and replacement of the wetland resources de-
stroyed due to the permitted fill activity. Prior to promulgation of
the compensatory mitigation regulations, the agencies set forth
their mitigation policy in various guidance documents, the foun-
dation of which are the Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines and a Memo-
randum of Agreement between the EPA and the Department of
the Army regarding mitigation under those guidelines ("MOA").252
The MOA articulates, among other things, the "no net loss" policy
for compensatory mitigation of wetlands.253
In April 2008 the Corps and the EPA jointly promulgated a
new wetlands mitigation rule under section 404 of the CWA stat-
249. Id. § 10.1-603.8.1(F) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
250. Id. § 10.1-603.8:1(D) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
251. Id. § 10.1-603.8:1(E) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
252. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Environmental Protection Agency and
the Department of the Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean
Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines (Feb. 6, 1990), available at http://www.saw.usace.
army.mil/WETLANDS/Policies/epa-moa.pdf.
253. Id. at 1.
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ing the avoidance, minimization, and compensation principles
originally set out in the MOA. -4 The new rule goes well beyond
the MOA in an effort to standardize the requirements for various
types of mitigation (such as creation of wetlands by a permittee,
mitigation banks, or in-lieu fee programs), establish new mitiga-
tion performance standards based on the best currently available
science, and encourage a watershed-based approach to mitiga-
tion.2 55 The DEQ recently promulgated guidance on how to apply
the new federal mitigation rule to the Virginia Water Protection
Program.256
The new rule creates a "hierarchy" for mitigation credits, with
a preference for mitigation bank credits, followed by in-lieu fee
program credits, then permittee-responsible mitigation ("PRM")
based on a watershed approach, PRM that is on-site and in-kind
and finally PRM that is off-site or out-of-kind. 257 This distinction
is based on the Corps' and the EPA's conclusion that fewer and
larger mitigation projects are more environmentally beneficial
than a multitude of smaller projects, even if those smaller
projects are more proximate to the site of the permitted wetland
destruction.25s
Under the new rule, all three types of mitigation must include
the same basic twelve components designed to provide higher
quality mitigation: (1) objectives, (2) site selection criteria, (3) site
protection instruments, (4) baseline information, (5) credit deter-
mination methodology, (6) mitigation work plan, (7) maintenance
plan, (8) ecological performance standards, (9) monitoring re-
quirements, (10) long-term management plan, (11) adaptive
management plan, and (12) financial assurances. 29 The planning
and approval process for in-lieu fee mitigation is closely parallel
to that for mitigation banks.260 An Interagency Review Team will
review both types of mitigation, and their plans will be subject to
254. Compensation Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594,
19,596 (Apr. 10, 2008) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 325, 332 (2008); 40 C.F.R. pt. 230).
255. Id. at 19,594.
256. See discussion infra IV.B.I.d.
257. Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. at 19,628;
see 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(b)(1)-(6); 40 C.F.R. § 230.93(b)(1)-(6).
258. See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. at
19,629.
259. Id. at 19,597; see 33 C.F.R. § 332.4(c); 40 C.F.R. 230.94(c).
260. See 33 C.F.R. § 332.8(a).
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public review and comment.261 With respect to mitigation by a
permittee, the regulations require more planning for mitigation
and approval of a final mitigation plan at the time of permit is-
suance.
26 2
The goal of compensation is to replace lost wetland values or
functions, not just to replace wetlands acre for acre. 263 The new
mitigation regulation provides that mitigation for wetlands losses
should provide replacement for functions, 264 taking a watershed
approach.265 Additionally, the new rule applies to stream mitiga-
tion as well as wetland mitigation, despite many commenters urg-
ing the agencies not to include stream mitigation because of the
evolving science relating to it. 266
Many of the prior policies and guidance for mitigation have
been superseded in whole or in part by the new regulation.2 67 In
addition, it is likely that there will be implementing protocols or
other guidance documents forthcoming. Wetlands mitigation,
therefore, will remain an area of regulatory development for some
time.
2. Application of National Ambient Air Quality Standards to the
Commonwealth
In 1997 the EPA adopted an eight-hour ozone National Am-
bient Air Quality Standard ("NAAQS") 268 under section 109 of the
Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 269 and in April 2004 the Agency published
a final rule designating areas of the country as either meeting or
261. Id. § 332.8(b)(1), (d)(4).
262. See id. § 332.4(c)(1).
263. See id. § 332.3(f)(1).
264. Id. ("[T]he amount of required compensatory mitigation must be, to the ex-
tent practicable, sufficient to replace lost aquatic resource functions. In cases
where appropriate functional or condition assessment methods or other suitable
metrics are available, these methods should be used where practicable to de-
termine how much compensatory mitigation is required. If a functional or con-
dition assessment or other suitable metric is not used, a minimum one-to-one
acreage or linear foot compensation ratio must be used.").
265. Id. § 332.3(c)(1).
266. Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594,
19,596 (Apr. 10, 2008).
267. See 33 C.F.R. § 332.1(f).
268. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856, 38,894
(July 18, 1997) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 50.10).
269. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2006).
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not meeting the eight-hour ozone NAAQS.2 70 The CAA requires
areas that have not attained compliance with the NAAQS to im-
plement a number of strategies to comply with the NAAQS by a
certain date.171 In the April 2004 rule, the EPA also created the
Early Action Compact ("EAC") program, whereby areas with
ozone concentrations that complied with the national one-hour
ozone standard and minimally exceeded the eight-hour ozone
NAAQS could enter into an agreement to defer designation of the
area as nonattainment.2 72 To enter an area into an EAC, a state
had to pledge to comply with the NAAQS at least two years before
the 2007 deadline under the CAA. 2 3 The benefit of deferring the
nonattainment designation is that certain CAA requirements,
such as controls on new sources of air emissions and the need for
transportation conformity determinations for infrastructure
projects, would not apply.274
The Roanoke and Winchester areas of Virginia were both
enrolled in the EAC program, and, because they met several mi-
lestones, the EPA deferred its designation decisions for the two
areas until April 15, 2008.25 In February 2008 the EPA proposed
to designate Roanoke and Winchester, along with eleven other
EAC areas, as attainment areas for the eight-hour ozone NAAQS,
based on the submission of air quality data from 2005, 2006, and
2007 demonstrating that each area had attained the eight-hour
ozone NAAQS.276
Interestingly, however, in March 2008 the EPA tightened the
primary and secondary eight-hour ozone NAAQS-both 0.075
ppm-as compared to the 1997 primary and secondary standards
of 0.080 ppm. 27 7 The EPA stated that it revised the standard due
270. Air Quality Designations and Classifications for the 8-Hour Ozone National Am-
bient Air Quality Standards; Early Action Compact Areas with Deferred Effective Dates,
69 Fed. Reg. 23,858, 23,858 (Apr. 30, 2004).
271. See 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c).
272. Air Quality Designations and Classifications for the 8-Hour Ozone National Am-
bient Air Quality Standards; Early Action Compact Areas with Deferred Effective Dates,
69 Fed. Reg. 23,858, 23875-76 (Apr. 30, 2004) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 81.300(e)).
273. See 40 C.F.R. § 81.300(e)(2)(iv).
274. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511-7511f (listing additional provisions for ozone nonat-
tainment areas).
275. 73 Fed. Reg. 17,897, 17,899 tbl.1 (Apr. 2, 2008).
276. Final 8-Hour Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards Designations for the
Early Action Compact Areas, 73 Fed. Reg. 6,863, 6,865 & tbl.1 (proposed Feb. 6, 2008).
277. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 Fed. Reg. 16,436, 16,436
(Mar. 27, 2008).
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to new scientific evidence regarding the adverse health effects of
ozone.278 All states were required to submit recommendations to
the EPA by March 2009 regarding designation of areas as at-
tainment or nonattainment for the new standard, and the EPA
will have until March 2010 to designate all areas of the country.7 9
Since states must submit State Implementation Plans within
three years of the adoption of new NAAQS, states must submit
plans setting forth strategies to meet the new ozone standard by
2011.280
The rule establishing the revised ozone NAAQS is silent with
respect to whether EACs will be used again to defer attainment
designations.281 Note that in the February 2008 proposed designa-
tion of the Roanoke and Winchester areas as attainment, Win-
chester was listed as having an eight-hour ozone level of 0.073
ppm and Roanoke was listed as having a level of 0.076 ppm. 282 Ac-
cordingly, under the revised standard, Winchester would be in at-
tainment and Roanoke would barely be out of attainment.
Finally, in September 2008 the EPA determined that the entire
Commonwealth is in attainment with the 2006 twenty-four-hour
standard for fine particulate matter that is smaller than 2.5 mi-
crometers in diameter.213
3. The EPA's Proposed Greenhouse Gas Endangerment Finding
and Mandatory Reporting Regulation
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court of the United
States determined that the EPA has legal authority under the
CAA to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles as air pollu-
tants and remanded to the agency to determine whether GHG
emissions endanger public health and welfare.2 8 4 As a result, in
April 2009 the EPA issued its Proposed Endangerment and
Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Sec-
278. See id.
279. Id. at 16,503.
280. Id.
281. 40 C.F.R. § 50.15(a), (b) (2008).
282. Final 8-Hour Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards Designations for the
Early Action Compact Areas, 73 Fed. Reg. 6863, 6865 tbl.1 (proposed Feb. 6, 2008).
283. See 2006 24-Hour PM2. Standards-Region 3 Designations, http://www.epa.gov/
pmdesignations/2006standards/final/region3.htm.
284. 549 U.S. 497, 532, 535 (2007).
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tion 202(a) of the Clean Air Act ("Proposed Endangerment Find-
ing").215 The EPA determined that six GHGs, namely carbon dio-
xide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydroflourocarbons, perflouro-
carbons, and sulfur hexafluoride, are air pollutants that can "rea-
sonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."26
The EPA also determined that the emission of these pollutants
from motor vehicles "cause or contribute" to levels of GHG in the
atmosphere sufficient to contribute to human-induced climate
change .28 As a result, once the proposed finding is final, under
section 202(a) of the CAA, the agency must establish standards
for GHG emissions from new motor vehicles.2 88
The Proposed Endangerment Finding was subject to public
comment until June 23, 2009, and the EPA will issue proposed
regulations for GHG emissions from motor vehicles only after
consideration of comments. 289
Meanwhile, the EPA also issued a proposed rule in April 2009
that would require mandatory reporting of GHGs from all sectors
of the economy.2 0 If adopted, the rule would require tens of thou-
sands of facilities to summarize and report their GHG emissions
on an annual basis. 91 In addition, any entity required to report
under the rule would also have to keep records related to their
reports and reportable activities for five years.2 12 Facilities would
be covered by the rule if they emit 25,000 metric tons or more of
carbon dioxide ("C0 2") per year or fall into a prescribed industrial
sector.293 This amount of CO 2 is created by burning about thirty
mmbtu/hr operating full time, over the course of a year. 211 Af-
fected sectors, which must report regardless of their CO2 emis-
sions, include: (1) manufacturers of electronics, lime, vehicles,
and engines; (2) producers of aluminum, cement, phosphoric acid,
nitric acid, and petrochemicals; (3) suppliers of coal, coal-based
liquid fuels, petroleum products, natural gas and natural gas liq-
285. 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (Apr. 24, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
286. Id. at 18,887-88.
287. See id. at 18,904.
288. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)).
289. See 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886.
290. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 16,448, 16,448 (proposed
Apr. 10, 2009) (to be codified in scattered sections of 40 C.F.R.).
291. See id. at 16,448 tbl.1.
292. Id. at 16,463.
293. Id. at 16,467.
294. Id. at 16,469.
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uids; and (4) petroleum refiners, coal mines, landfills, and ma-
nure management operations. 295
As drafted, the rule would cover the transportation sector
through information provided by vehicle and engine manufactur-
ers and fuel suppliers and would not require reporting from indi-
vidual or fleet vehicle operators.2 96 However, the EPA sought
comment on whether it should change this approach. 297 The EPA
also requested comment on an unusually wide range of additional
questions, including: (1) whether EPA should collect information
on electricity purchases; 298 (2) whether vehicle fleet operators
should report their emissions (as proposed, they will not);29 (3)
whether biomass fuel suppliers should have to report emissions
(as drafted, they will not); 00 (4) what GHGs should be covered by
the rule;30 1 (5) for several industrial sectors, which of several sug-
gested calculation methodologies should be used and, for some, if
emission estimates should be deemed sufficient; 312 (6) whether
sources, where feasible, should be required to have continuous
emissions monitoring systems;30 and (7) how the EPA should col-
lect, manage, and disseminate data under the rule2 04 The com-
ment period was open until June 9, 2009. 305 Thus, many of the
specifics of the proposed rule remain open to input, discussion,
and change.
B. Virginia Regulatory Developments
1. Water Regulations (Revised Stormwater Regs.)
a. Revisions to Water Quality Standards
Both section 303(c) of the CWA and the State Water Control
Law requires that the Water Control Board adopt, modify, or can-
295. Id. at 16,461-62.
296. See id. at 16,459.
297. Id. at 16,466 n.46.
298. Id. at 16,473.
299. Id. at 16,466 n.46.
300. Id. at 16,466.
301. Id. at 16,464.
302. Id. at 16,469.
303. See id. at 16,453, 16,474.
304. Id. at 16,453.
305. Id. at 16,448.
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cel state water quality standards every three years.30 6 In 2008 the
Water Control Board undertook this mandated triennial review
and adopted several revisions to the standards based on updated
scientific data, consultation with an ad hoc advisory committee,
and public comments submitted on the proposed regulations. 0 7
Regulatory changes included: (1) revision of pH criteria and ex-
panded narrative criteria for Class VII swamp waters to reflect
that natural quality for dissolved oxygen and pH fluctuate and
these fluctuating values are not considered violations of the crite-
ria;"8 (2) numerous revisions to criteria to protect designated uses
from impacts of nutrients and suspended sediment in the Chesa-
peake Bay and its tidal tributaries; 30 9 and (3) updated human
health and aquatic life criteria.3 1 Notably, after receiving public
comment, the Water Control Board decided not to relax the exist-
ing 0.8% risk level E. coli bacteria criteria, as it originally had
proposed."'
b. General Stormwater Permit for Construction Activities
The Water Control Board issued a five-year General Virginia
Stormwater Management Program ("VSMP") Permit for Dis-
charges of Stormwater from Construction Activities ("Construc-
tion General Permit") on July 1, 2004.312 The permit regulated
"the discharge of stormwater from construction sites that disturb
1 acre or more of land (2,500 sq. feet in Bay Act areas), and from
smaller sites that are part of a larger, common plan of develop-
306. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15(3a) (Cum. Supp. 2009).
307. Virginia Department of Environmental Quality, Reviewing Virginia's Water Qual-
ity Standards: An Overview of Proposed Changes, http://www.deq.virginia.gov/info/water
standards.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
308. Numerical Criteria for Dissolved Oxygen, pH, and Maximum Temperature, 25 Va.
Reg. Regs. 2133, 2139 (Feb. 16, 2009) (codified at 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-260-50 (2009)).
309. Criteria to Protect Designated Uses from the Impacts of Nutrients and Suspended
Sediment in the Chesapeake Bay and its Tidal Tributaries, 25 Va. Reg. Regs. 2133, 2163
(Feb. 16, 2009) (codified at 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-260-285 (2009)).
310. Criteria for Surface Water, 25 Va. Reg. Regs. 2133, 2140 (Feb. 16, 2009) (codified
at 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-260-140 (2009)).
311. See State Water Control Bd., Final Regulation Agency Background Document 1, 4
(Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.deq.virginia.gov/wqs/documents/TRTownhall-formFINAL
170CT2008.pdf.
312. Va. Dep't of Conservation & Recreation, Va. Stormwater Mgmt. Program (USMP)
Permit Regulations 1 (July 22, 2008), http://www.dcr.virginia.gov/documents/stmorienttac.
pdf [hereinafter USMP Permit Document].
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ment."3 3 The permit "requires operators of such construction sites
to implement stormwater controls and develop stormwater pollu-
tion prevention plans [("SWPPPs")] to prevent sediment and oth-
er pollutants associated with construction sites from being dis-
charged in stormwater runoff."314
Effective January 29, 2005, the Virginia Soil and Water Con-
servation Board ("VSW Board") assumed responsibility for the
VSMP;315 therefore, it was responsible for issuance of a new Con-
struction General Permit before June 30, 2009.316 A technical ad-
visory committee convened in 2008 to assist the VSW Board with
refining and developing permit revisions and coordinating with
the EPA and the Virginia Department of Conservation and
Recreation ("DCR").317
The VSW Board issued an amended Construction General
Permit on March 6, 2009, after a vigorous sixty-day comment pe-
riod.31 8 Key components of the revised permit include: (1) adding
and revising definitions for such terms as "best management
practice," "control measure," "discharge of a pollutant," and "mi-
nor modification;"13 9 (2) requiring that construction stormwater
discharges not cause or contribute to a violation of any applicable
water quality standard;320 (3) mandating that discharges to wa-
ters identified as impaired are not eligible for coverage under the
permit unless the operator ensures that the discharges do not
cause or contribute to a water quality standard violation;321 and
(4) updating the requirements for a SWPPP for a construction
site.322
313. Id. at4.
314. Id.
315. See Act of Apr. 8, 2004, ch. 372, 2004 Va. Acts 502, 503-04 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. § 10.1-603.2:1 (Cum. Supp. 2004)); 4 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 50-60-1120 (2009).
316. 4 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 50-60-1120.
317. See USMP Permit Document, supra note 312, at 1.
318. See Virginia Stormwater Management Program (VSMP) Permit Regulations, 25
Va. Reg. Regs. 2838 (Apr. 13, 2009) (to be codified at 4 VA. ADMIN. CODE pt. 50-60).
319. Id. at 2839-42 (to be codified at 4 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 50-60-10).
320. Id. at 2850 (to be codified at 4 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 50-60-1130(B)(3)).
321. Id. at 2840-50, 2856 (to be codified at 4 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 50-60-1130(A), 50-60-
1170(H)).
322. Id. at 2851 (to be codified at 4 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 50-60-1140).
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c. Proposed Revisions to Other Stormwater Regulations
The VSW Board currently is revising Parts I, II, and III of the
VSMP regulations with the assistance of another technical advi-
sory committee.3 23 The proposed regulations were published on
June 22, 2009, which commenced a sixty-day public comment pe-
riod.2 4 As with the revisions to the Construction General Permit,
significant public comment is anticipated from environmental or-
ganizations as well as the development community.
In summary, the voluminous proposed regulations (1) amend
technical criteria applicable to stormwater discharges from con-
struction activities, (2) establish minimum criteria for locality-
administered stormwater management programs (qualifying local
programs) and local stormwater management programs adminis-
tered by the DCR, (3) authorize procedures and review proce-
dures for qualifying local programs, and (4) amend the definitions
applicable to all of the VSMP regulations.125
With regard to technical criteria applicable to stormwater discharges
from construction activities, revised water quality and water quanti-
ty requirements are proposed to be included in Part II of the regula-
tions. [Such] requirements include a 0.28 lbs/acre/year phosphorus
standard for new development, a requirement that total phosphorus
loads be reduced to an amount at least 20% below the pre-
development phosphorus load on prior developed lands, and a re-
quirement that control measures be installed on a site to meet any
applicable wasteload allocation. Water quantity requirements in-
clude both channel protection and flood protection criteria.
3 2 6
Pursuant to Virginia Code section 10.1-603.3, which requires
the establishment of stormwater management programs by local-
ities327 the proposed regulations also set minimum criteria and
ordinance requirements for qualifying VSW Board-authorized,
and DCR-administered local stormwater management programs
that include "administration, plan review, issuance of coverage
under the [Construction General Permit], inspection, enforce-
323. Virginia Stormwater Management Program (VSMP) Permit Regulations, 25 Va.
Reg. Regs. 3793, 3801 (proposed June 22, 2009).
324. See id. at 3793.
325. See id. at 3796.
326. Id.
327. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-603.3 (Cum. Supp. 2009).
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ment, reporting, and recordkeeping."321 Additionally, the proposed
regulations establish VSW Board procedures for authorizing a lo-
cality to administer a qualifying local program. 329
d. DEQ Guidance Documents
Virginia Code section 62.1-44.15:21 was amended in 2008 to
create an exemption from the requirement to obtain a VWP Per-
mit for the construction or maintenance of certain agricultural
and silvicultural ponds and impoundments.33° In October 2008 the
DEQ Water Division issued Water Guidance Memo No. 08-2012
to assist agency staff in interpreting and clarifying how applica-
tions for such activities should be processed relative to water
withdrawal permitting and section 404 permit actions by the
Corps.331 This guidance clarifies that pursuant to the amended
statute, to be excluded from permit requirements, a farm or stock
pond or impoundment must (1) "be constructed or maintained for
normal agricultural or silvicultural activities; and [(2)] be exempt
from Dam Safety Regulations, because it has a dam height of less
than 25 feet or a maximum impoundment capacity smaller than
100 acre-feet."'332 Water withdrawal from such ponds or impound-
ments, however, is still subject to permit requirements. 33 The
guidance also clarifies the appropriate actions that DEQ should
take pursuant to section 401 of the CWA if the pond or impound-
ment is subject to section 404 permitting requirements. 3 4
On March 19, 2009, the DEQ Water Division issued a second
guidance memorandum defining how DEQ will support the new
wetlands compensatory mitigation rule issued by the Corps and
the EPA in 2008335 when reviewing and accepting compensatory
328. Virginia Stormwater Management Program (VSMP) Permit Regulations, 25 Va.
Reg. Regs. 3808, 3819 (proposed June 22, 2009).
329. Id. at 3819.
330. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
331. Memorandum from Ellen Gilinsky, Dir., Va. Dep't of Envtl. Quality Water Div., to
Reg'l Dirs. 1 (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.deq.virginia.gov/waterguidance/pdf/082012.pdf.
332. Id. at 4-5.
333. Id. at 5.
334. Id. at 6.
335. Memorandum from Ellen Gilinsky, Dir., Va. Dep't of Envtl. Quality Water Div., to
Reg'l Dirs. 1 (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.deq.virginia.gov/waterguidance/pdf/092004.pdf
[hereinafter Water Guidance Memo No. 09-2004]; see discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
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mitigation packages until the Virginia Water Protection Program
("VWPP") can be revised to conform to the federal rule.336
The guidance states that the DEQ supports the federal rule
and concurs with the preference hierarchy that it sets forth for
the various types of compensatory mitigation activities that can
be undertaken.337 The guidance articulates a justification for fol-
lowing the federal rule in implementing the VWPP, focusing on
the consistency between the objectives of the two programs, the
authority under Virginia law for purchasing mitigation bank cre-
dits and in-lieu fee compensation, the use of permittee-
responsible on-site and off-site mitigation in areas that lack miti-
gation bank and in-lieu fee options, and the application of the wa-
tershed approach to mitigation under Virginia law.338 Additional-
ly, the guidance addresses circumstances supporting deviation
from the hierarchy preference and recommends actions to reach
consensus with the Corps in such instances.3 39
2. Air Regulations
The Air Pollution Control Board took final action on several
regulations in late 2008 and early 2009.-1 The most substantive
are summarized below.
In late 2008 the Air Pollution Control Board made several revi-
sions to its regulations relating to air permits for stationary
sources.341 The regulations were amended to incorporate addition-
al opportunity for public comment and public hearings342 man-
dated by the 2008 legislation discussed above. 343
336. See Water Guidance Memo No. 09-2004, supra note 335, at 1.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 5-7.
339. Id. at 7.
340. The Air Pollution Control Board also updated the Hazardous Air Pollutant
Sources Regulation, 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE pt. 5-60, to incorporate numerous federal regula-
tions by reference. Hazardous Air Pollutant Sources, 25 Va. Reg. Regs. 2073 (Feb. 16,
2009). The revised regulation also notes federal standards that the Commonwealth is not
incorporating, along with a statement that the EPA is responsible for enforcing such stan-
dards. Id. at 2073.
341. See Permits for Stationary Sources, 25 Va. Reg. Regs. 1218 (Nov. 24, 2008) (to be
codified at 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 5-80-1615, 5-80-1695).
342. Public Hearings to Contest Permit Actions, 25 Va. Reg. Regs. 1231, 1235-37 (codi-
fied at 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE 5-80-35 (2009)).
343. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
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Another 2008 revision was to change the applicability test for
modifications to minor new stationary sources of air emissions
from the "actual-to-potential emissions test" to an "uncontrolled-
to-uncontrolled emission rate test."34 This change involved (1) de-
leting the definition of "actual emissions," which contained the
actual-to-potential test; (2) adding a new definition for "uncon-
trolled emission rate"; and (3) replacing "actual emissions" with
"the uncontrolled emission rate" throughout the regulation.345
Provisions relating to alternative fuels and air emissions also
were revised for consistency with Virginia Code section 10.1-
1322.4 "and provide an exception from the requirement to submit
the exemption demonstration for certain fuels."346
Additionally, the Prevention of Significant Deterioration New
Source Review Program ("NSR") was "revised to specify that ni-
trogen oxides ... are a precursor of ozone in addition to volatile
organic compounds.., in the definitions of 'major modification'
'major stationary source,' 'regulated NSR pollutant' and 'signifi-
cant,' and the list of exempted facilities."347
In June 2009 the Air Pollution Control Board proposed a fast-
track regulation to combine the terms and conditions of all the
components of the NSR into one permit. 348 This revision, which
went into effect in late July 2009, also reworked exemptions re-
lating to the use of alternative fuels and raw materials in order to
comply with a recent statutory amendment to Virginia Code sec-
tion 10.1-1322.4.349
Additionally, in order to be consistent with the EPA's newly re-
vised eight-hour ozone NAAQS, 350 the Air Pollution Control Board
amended the regulations to incorporate the federal standard into
the state regulation so that the Commonwealth can prepare at-
tainment and maintenance plans and determine whether a new
344. Permits for Stationary Sources, 25 Va. Reg. Regs. 1257, 1258, 1262, 1267 (Nov. 24,
2008) (to be codified in scattered sections of 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE).
345. Id. at 1258-59, 1262, 1264, 1267.
346. Id. at 1258.
347. Permits for Stationary Sources, 25 Va. Reg. Regs. 1218, 1218 (Nov. 24, 2008).
348. Permits for Stationary Sources, 25 Va. Reg. Regs. 3489, 3490 (June 8, 2009).
349. Id. at 3489-90.
350. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2
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source of air emissions will affect compliance with the NAAQS.35
This revision also added a new standard of 0.15 ppm for lead.352
Finally, the Air Pollution Control Board promulgated a regula-
tion applicable to open burning, including model ordinances for
localities to adopt to regulate the activity.3 53 This regulatory ac-
tion recodified the Emission Standards for Open Burning as the
Regulation for Open Burning and repealed the previous Open
Burning Rule. 354
3. Solid and Hazardous Waste Regulations
The Virginia Waste Management Board has not promulgated
or amended any significant new regulations in 2008 through the
first half of 2009. It is, however, currently in the process of recodi-
fying the Solid Waste Management Regulation 355 in order to make
it more concise and easy for the regulated community and public
to follow and to incorporate the Vegetative Waste Management
and Yard Waste Regulation.3 56 Other proposed revisions include
pre-approved alternate liner and cover designs, new standards for
centralized sludge treatment facilities, less onerous standards for
composting and other types of facilities that are higher up in the
waste hierarchy, including a change from full permit to permit-
by-rule status for composting facilities, and consolidation of ex-
emptions into one section.3 57 The proposed regulation was pub-
lished in the Virginia Register of Regulations in early July 2009,
and the public comment period ended September 4, 2009.358
Two other regulatory amendments have completed the Notice
of Intended Regulatory Action ("NOIRA") stage in the past year.
In 2008 the Board proposed amendments to the Voluntary Re-
mediation Regulations 359 to revise program procedures so that
351. Ambient Air Quality Standards, 25 Va. Reg. Regs. 3297, 3297-302 (May 25, 2009).
352. Id. at 3298, 3302.
353. See Regulation for Open Burning, 25 Va. Reg. Regs. 2088 (Feb. 16, 2009) (to be
codified at 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE pt. 5-130).
354. Id. at 2088.
355. 25 Va. Reg. Regs. 4048 (proposed July 6, 2009). The proposed regulatory action
would repeal sections 20-80 and 20-101 and adopt section 20-81 of title 9 of the Virginia
Administrative Code. Id.
356. Id. at 4048-49.
357. See id. at 4049, 4051.
358. Id. at 4048.
359. 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-160-10 to 20-160-120 (2004).
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sites contaminated with hazardous substances can be processed
more efficiently to facilitate voluntary clean-up. 60 Such revisions
include improving reporting requirements, updating sampling
and analysis methods to reflect current technology, and clarifying
eligibility, termination, and application requirements.3 61 The
NOIRA was published in May 2008, and the public comment pe-
riod ended in July 2008.362 No further action, however, has been
taken on this regulatory revision .63
In June 2009 the Board also published a NOIRA on the
amendment of the Coal Combustion Byproducts ("CCB") Regula-
tions to include "additional restrictions on the use and placement"
of CCB.36 The Virginia Waste Management Board planned revi-
sions to specify that unamended CCB placed in a one hundred-
year floodplain is not exempt from the definition of solid waste or
from solid waste permitting requirements.3 65 The Virginia Waste
Management Board also expressed interest in restrictions on the
use and placement of amended and unamended CCB and provi-
sions for public participation on CCB projects.3 66
360. Notice of Intended Regulatory Action, 24 Va. Reg. Regs. 2499 (May 12, 2008).
361. Waste Mgmt. Bd., Notice of Intended Regulatory Action (NOIRA) Agency Back-
ground Document 2 (Jan. 31, 2008), http://www.townhall.state.va.us/Uviewstage.cfm?Sta
geid=4505&display=documents (follow "Documents" tab; then follow "Agency Statement"
hyperlink).
362. Notice of Intended Regulatory Action, 24 Va. Reg. Regs. 2499 (May 12, 2008).
363. Va. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, Va. Waste Mgmt. Bd., Voluntary Remediation Regula-
tions, Notice of Intended Regulatory Action, http://www.townhall.state.va.us/Ljviewstage.
cfm?stageid=4505&display=general (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
364. 25 Va. Reg. Regs. 3474 (June 8, 2009).
365. Id.
366. Id.
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